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INTRODUCTION

That "computer" was once a job description-a profession is probably
a fact few people know. Or remember-it was not that long ago.' A similar
fate may await "printers," once a term associated primarily with the
typographical trades rather than something that sits on your desk. Scriveners
no longer exist even in the form of peripheral equipment, though a word
processing program bearing the name is available. 2 As a human professionone directly related to the practice of law scriveners have been mostly driven
out of existence in the United States by copy machines and typewriters, living
on mainly as the stubborn character working in the law offices of the Herman
Melville short story bearing his name. 3
One could probably come up with a long list of "-er/-or" jobs that were
once performed by humans that have either disappeared completely or have
been or are in the process of being replaced by pieces of equipment,
computers, or (more recently and fashionably) robots and artificial

* Professor, Doshisha Law School (Kyoto).
1.
See, e.g., MARGOT LEE SHETTERLY, HIDDEN FIGURES: THE AMERICAN DREAM AND
THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE BLACK WOMEN MATHEMATICIANS WHO HELPED WIN THE SPACE
RACE (2016) (describing the role played by African-American women "computers" in the
American space program).
2.
Scrivener,
LITERATURE
AND
LATTE,
https://www.literatureandlatte.com/
scrivener/overview (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
3.
HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER (1853). The UK still has a small
scrivener notary" profession, which has ancient roots and offers civil law notarial services. See
THE SOCIETY OF SCRIVENER NOTARIES, http://www.scrivener-notaries.org.uk/ (last visited Feb.

18, 2018).
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intelligence (AI). This Article will speculate about if and how this could
happen to one such profession lawyers. 4
The subject of this symposium issue is the impact of Al on the practice of
law. From the outset, I will leave it to other authors in this issue to grapple
with the definition of Al. The possible threat to numerous professions, not just
lawyers, is an interesting subject worthy of much consideration. It is also an
exciting one when combined with parallel discourse about weaponized robots
and killer drone swarms.5
My own belief is that we have yet to appreciate the full impact of older,
yet still comparatively new, technologies such as the internet and mobile
communications. These are essentially "dumb" technologies (the "artificial
stupidity" in the title), yet they have impacted the practice of law and are new
enough that the full potential of their impact may be yet to come.6 As noted
by Neil Postman, it took about half a century from the invention of the printing
press before people started putting numbers on the pages of books.7
As for Al, what often seems absent from the debate about how it should
interact with the law, yet may be particularly relevant to the practice of law,
is the ways in which Al can (and inevitably will, in my view) be used by
humans as a means of avoiding responsibility. There are precedents
supporting this view as I will try to illustrate.

4.
I will leave it to others to speculate on the fate of another: professors.
5.
See, e.g., Jessica Schladebeck, Experts Warn Against Killer' Drones in
Slaughterbots' Video, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news
/world/experts-warn-killer-drones-new-slaughterbots-video-article-1.3648289.
6.
I suppose it is incumbent on me to attempt to define "dumb technology." I would
propose that it refers to technology that is programmed to react in a predetermined way to a
specific factual input. "Dumb" is a demeaning term, of course, and should not mislead as to the
potential ramification of any particular technology, where the limitations may not be so much
"intelligence" as it is computing power. For example, facial recognition technology that can
identify wanted criminals on the street from surveillance camera footage or voice recognition
software that could validate the identity of persons making transactions over the telephone would
constitute "dumb technologies" in my view. One could perhaps argue that Al is simply a higher
order of such evaluative technologies, but from there it seems just a short step to the "does free
will exist" question of human philosophy and is thus probably unhelpful. At the very least, what
I consider "dumb technology" should behave in a way that is predictable to the person who
designed it, so long as that person knows the inputs.
7. See NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY
62 (Vintage Books 1st ed. 1993) (1992); Naomi S. Baron, When DidBooks Get Page Numbersand Are They Even Useful Anymore?, SLATE: LEXICON VALLEY (Feb. 11, 2015, 2:35 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon valley/2015/02/1 1/page numbers_wheredid theycome
from and are theyevenusefulanymore.html.
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II. DUMB TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEED FOR LAWYERS

That technology has changed the practice of law goes without saying. At
the Washington, D.C. law firm where I was a summer associate in the early
1990s, I was given a desk with a pad of paper and a pencil and shown the
location of the word processor room, full of human word processors operating
a Wang mainframe system. As a junior associate in the days before email, the
practice of international business transactions rotated around getting
documents to the courier in time or faxing them for the close or opening of
business on the other side of the world. Writing in 2018, I know at least one
lawyer (younger than me!) who still dictates letters on cassette tape for his
secretaries to type out. Such examples hopefully illustrate how technology
that most young people probably take for granted has enabled lawyers to do
more.
Yet technology has also hopefully freed lawyers and other fee earners
from more mundane tasks such as printing out and collating documents,
standing around fax machines, waiting for modems to connect to the Westlaw
database, and so forth. Even the simple ability to do keyword searches,
whether in a legal database or a document, has doubtless saved countless
hours of junior associate time that can be fruitfully used (and ideally billed!)
for tasks other than poring over reams of text.
In more sophisticated form, such technologies have revolutionized
documentary discovery. Whereas complex corporate litigation might involve
sitting in a room full of printed out emails and a team of lawyers and
paralegals reading through them page by page, the sheer volume of digital
records involved in such cases has effectively necessitated a search-term
based approach. In 2012, I attended an international conference on the legal
profession, and one of the speakers had a slide showing a picture of a server
room: "this used to be done by lawyers" was his observation. An article dated
the same year on the American Bar Association (ABA) website indicated
external counsel were doing a poor job of accommodating the technological
issues faced by institutional clients in responding to the challenges of ediscovery,' so perhaps further displacement by technology and people who
understand it better is inevitable ("e-discovery professional" having
apparently become a new legal practice-related job description). 9

8.
Zachary G. Newman, Hot Topics and Recent Court Decisions in E-Discovery, AM.
BAR Ass'N (June 20, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/corporate/
articles/spring2012-0612-hot-topics-recent-court-decisions-ediscovery.html.
9.
Fittingly, perhaps, when reviewed in February of 2018, the "E-Discovery" portion of
the ABA website containing the article cited in the preceding footnote did not appear to have
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Yet while e-discovery or computer-assisted research may involve much
augmentation and even substitution of human legal professionals with
technology, it is still led by lawyers. In my view, however, the real impact of
dumb technologies is probably not going to be seen in its further layering on
top of tasks performed by lawyers and paralegals in a way that frees the
humans involved from drudgery or makes their performance more efficient.
While we are seeing these changes take place in the span of a lifetime-a
career I think the real impact of such innovation will be in reordering society
and human interactions in a way that makes lawyers unnecessary in the first
place.
I currently live in Guam. Although it is an American territory, buying
some items from Amazon's U.S. website is difficult or impossible. 10 The
system simply will not allow the order to be placed. In the case of some thirdparty sellers or items, a legal reason may underlie this, as Guam is outside the
U.S. customs territory, but as a basic matter-arguably a more basic matter
than whatever the law is Amazon's system coding will simply not let the
transaction close. Other commercial websites similarly generate different
results in how transactions take place depending on whether their address
input menu treats Guam as a "country" in a country menu or as a "state" within
a sub-menu under the United States.
Perhaps a lawyer helped set this system up, but none seem necessary to
keep it functioning. Moreover, the fact that I am a lawyer gives me no
advantage in dealing with this manner of transacting. Like everyone else, I
sign click-through contracts without reading their terms. What would be the
point? My only choice is to transact or not. There is no way for me to start a
"battle of the forms" or even a signature line where I could hope to scrawl in
a petulant "subject to . . ." objection. As to any individual terms in the contract

that I blindly click-sign, I would rather take my chances on the highly unlikely
event of a post-facto dispute resulting in a finding that they are egregious or
unconscionable. What other options do I have?
Similarly, to technological naifs like me, the content on my iPhone,
including photographs and other content I have created, is protected (or not)
and regulated first and foremost by what the various hardware and software
elements will allow me to do with it. There does not appear to be any "iTunes

been updated for over two years. It still contained an invitation to members to participate in an
"upcoming" E-Discovery seminar in May 2015. E-Discovery, AM. BAR Ass'N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/resources/e-discovery.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2018).
10.

See Amazon Shipping to Guam, FLYCRATES, https://flycrates.com/amazon-shipping-

to-guam (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
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rental stores" or even physical sharing for copyright lawyers to lament or
make exaggerated claims about as there were with CDs or records before
them. " Of course there are countless things protected by intellectual property
laws lurking in my iPhone, but they play virtually no role in regulating the
way I use it. Someone more tech savvy than I might try to do things to their
iPhone that would actually implicate those laws, but I suspect the vast
majority of iPhone users are, like me, regulated primarily by its code rather
than law.
In his seminal 1999 book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Professor
Lawrence Lessig posited that as more human activity starts to take place
through computerized technology and over the internet, the code that makes
it possible will increasingly supplant law as the means by which behavior is
regulated. 12 The law Lessig was particularly concerned about was that of
copyright, though in 2006, he published an updated version in which he
discussed the broader implications (at the time) of how code could come to
supplant law. He predicted "[a]future of control in large part exercised by
technologies ofcommerce, backed by the rule of law (orat least what's left of
the rule of law) ."13

"What's left of the rule of law" may well require fewer lawyers. Right
now, there are people using blockchain technology to write "smart" contracts
that can self-execute in accordance with code-based interactions. 14 Probably
few of them are lawyers, and self-executing contracts do not need lawyers for
enforcement either.
Despite the "smart" in smart contract and the newness of blockchain, it
is, in my view, still an example of essentially dumb technology one that
reacts in a predetermined way to specific events (transactions). It nonetheless

11. See, e.g., Mike Masnik, Copyfraud: Copyright Claims on CDs Say It's Infringement
to Loan Your CD to a Friend, TECHDIRT (Dec. 28, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20121226/13141921491,/copyfraud-copyright-claims-cds-say-its-infringement-to-loan-your-cd
-to-friend.shtml.
12. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
13. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 2.0, at 4 (2nd ed.
2006).
14. According to Ethereum, the decentralized blockchain smart-contracting platform,
smart contracts:
contain code functions and can interact with other contracts, make decisions, store
data, and send ether to others. Contracts are defined by their creators, but their
execution, and by extension the services they offer, is provided by the ethereum
network itself. They will exist and be executable as long as the whole network exists,
and will only disappear if they were programmed to self-destruct.
Building a Smart Contract Using the Command Line, ETHEREUM (last visited Feb. 10, 2018),
https://www.ethereum.org/greeter.
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seems likely to revolutionize the practice of law, even if by just making
lawyers superfluous in growing areas of commerce and daily life it touches.
Regardless of their specialty, most lawyers are essentially intermediaries;
they add value by bridging an uncertainty-based gap between client and client
goals. A client's uncertainty may come in the form of a lack of trust in a
proposed counterparty, ambiguous wording in a statute or regulation, inability
to comprehend the ramifications of complex documentation, a circuit split on
the interpretation of a statute, or vaguely perceived risks of numerous other
kinds. Lawyers add knowledge and experience-based evaluative capabilities.
They can help enforce a transaction against a recalcitrant counterparty or
judgment debtor and can even be an additional liability nexus in complex
transactions or litigation; if it goes poorly, lawyers can be sued for negligence.
To the extent technologies such as blockchain eliminate uncertainty and
remove the traditional trust/don't trust dichotomy from the equation, they
make lawyers and other transactional intermediaries superfluous. The same is
true of technologies that validate ownership, identity, or status. If predictions
prove true about the potential of blockchain to facilitate the monetization of
vast quantities of land in developing nations by making it possible to establish
and maintain reliable land title records," one wonders if there will be much
left for conveyancing lawyers to do in places where this actually happens.
The degree to which a dumb technology, like blockchain, alone can
supplant human professionals may be particularly hard for Americans to grasp
because of their nation's archaic reliance on courts and lawyers who
participate in what is often a fayade of litigation to produce documentary proof
of legal status or ownership. On this point, alternatives can be demonstrated
without even bringing technology into the discussion. Here, I must ask the
reader to indulge in a brief diversion into another area of my research,
Japanese law.
In Japan, bigamy is a crime. 16 It is also a crime that is difficult to commit.
Japan has a family registry system in which a marriage (involving at least one
Japanese person) must be registered in order to take effect. 17 The same is true
of divorces.'" Births and deaths are also recorded in the registry system, as are

15. See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: How THE
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOlN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 193-95
(2016).
16. KEIHO [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 184 (Japan).
17. KOSEKIHO [FAM. REG. ACT] 1947, art. 16, para. 1 (Japan); MINPO [CIV. C.] 1896,
art. 739, para. 1 (Japan).
18. KOSEKIHO, art. 76; MINPO, art. 763-64.
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the formation and dissolution of adoptive relationships.' 9 Since the registry
system is designed to provide a current snapshot of a person's family status,
someone who the system showed as currently married would be prevented by
the registry administrators from registering a second marriage. Thus, although
most records are now computerized, even when it was a paper-based system
with handwritten entries, the system has long functioned in a code-like fashion
by preventing prohibited "transactions" such as bigamy from occurring in the
first place.20
Moreover, consensual divorces and the dissolution of some adoptive
relationships can be conducted merely by filing paperwork with the registry
authorities; approximately 90% of divorces-including many involving
allocations of parental authority over children take place in this fashion. 2' A
court's involvement is only needed if parties cannot agree on the terms of the
divorce or if one party does not want to separate; the very small proportion of
divorces and resulting allocations of parental authority over children of the
marriage that are accomplished through a court decree are also reflected in the
registry, making it unnecessary to ever use a court document as proof of
divorce.22
Marriage licensing is one of many possible applications for blockchain, 23
but the point is not just that technology can replace existing legacy systems.
A person with just a marriage certificate whether paper or blockchainderived can prove that he or she married a particular person on a particular
date in the past but will still be unable to prove the marriage is still in force
today because proving the absence of a divorce decree somewhere is
practically impossible. Before the internet, let alone blockchain, even existed,
such proof was possible through Japan's family registry system; official
extracts of which serve to prove a person's birth, death, age, marriage,

19. KOSEKIHO, art. 49-59 (birth); KOSEKIHO, art. 86-94 (death and disappearance);
KOSEKIHO, art. 66-69-2 (adoption); MINPO, art. 799, 800, 812 (adoption). Note that Japanese
law provides for two types of adoption, but it is not necessary to distinguish between them for
purposes of this Article.
20. There is of course the possibility of human error or caprice on the part of the human
administrator. For an overview of the system in English, see Colin Jones, Family Registers:
Appreciating Japan's Koseki System, JAPAN FORWARD (Sept. 28, 2017), https://japanforward.com/family-registers-appreciating-japans-koseki-system/.
2 1. Id.
22.
23.

KOSEKIHO, art. 15.
ARSHDEEP BAHGA & VIJAY MADISETTI, BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS: A HANDS ON

APPROACH 54 (2017).
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divorce, parentage, and so forth. 24 The existence of the family registry system
means that court decrees are not used as proof of status in Japan the way they
are in the United States. 25

Similarly, family register records can also be used to establish the
universe of a decedent's possible heirs, and if all of those heirs are present and
agree to a disposition, funds may be released from a bank account or real
estate re-titled, all without going to court for proceedings to settle an estate.
There is a rich body of literature on the subject of why Japan has so few
lawyers and why Japanese people litigate with such less frequency than
Americans. 26 Some of it is fanciful (none of the works cited below are), but
to my knowledge, none of this literature addresses one possible and very basic
factor: that courts in Japan are not needed or used to produce official
documents, whether a divorce decree or letters probate, as they are in the
United States and other common law jurisdictions.
While there do not appear to be statistics on this exact point, the number
of American lawyers who pay their rent in part through uncontested divorces
or routine probate matters is unlikely to be small. In Japan, they probably do
not exist.
To return to the subject at hand, the point of this diversion is not to argue
that the Japanese family register system is necessarily better.27 The point is

24. Of course, the situation gets more complicated when Japanese people get married or
divorced abroad, though the register system does allow for filings from abroad. KOSEKIHO, art.
40-42.
25. The Civil Code rules on parental authority are also clear and unambiguous: mother
has it over children born out of wedlock (absent circumstances), mother and father have it during
marriage, and only one parent has it after divorce. MINPO [CIV. C.] 1896, art. 818-19 (Japan).
A family register extract thus also serves as proof of who is responsible for minor children and
has legal authority to deal on their behalf.
26. See, e.g., Frank K. Upham, Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition, in
MIRROR OF MODERNITY: INVENTED TRADITIONS OF MODERN JAPAN 48, 57, 59-61 (Stephen

Vlastos ed., 1998); John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD.
359, 362, 385 (1978); Tom Ginsburg & Takao Tanase, JapaneseLitigiousness and "Taking
Kawashima Seriously ", Proceedings from the 2005 Sho Sato Conference in Honor of Takao
Tanase (Feb. 12-13, 2005), available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uplo
ads/2015/07/ginsburg-tanase-comment.pdf; Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Legal Consciousnessof
Contract in Japan,7 L. JAPAN 1 (1974). On the subject of lawyer numbers, it is important to be
aware that Japan has a multitude of legal professions, only one of which is privileged to represent
clients in all Japanese courts. See, e.g., Colin P.A. Jones, Amakudari and Japanese Law, 22
MICH. ST. INT'L L. REV. 879, 907-23 (2014).
27. Among other things, its inflexibility (a bug for individual families and their members,
a feature for everyone else who needs to rely on register records to produce a reliable,
unambiguous picture of a person's current status) imposes arguably outmoded family structures
and requirements on Japanese people and is the subject of widespread criticism (including by
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that it is possible to imagine a way of organizing existing government and
society in a way that requires fewer lawyers without even bringing technology
into the equation.28
Moreover, to the extent that available technology favors a particular
manner of organizing particular relationships or transactions through lowering
costs and increasing certainty, it seems logical to anticipate further reorganization of peripheral relationships and transactions in a similar manner.
As a static concept, a blockchain-based marriage registry makes perfect sense.
But if in the near future there are also widely-used, blockchain-based systems
of real property title registration, share ownership, or banking transactions,
does it not seem inevitable that, at some point, the systems would start to
interconnect (particularly in community property jurisdictions)? Doubtless,
lawyers will still find things to argue about in divorce cases, but who actually
owns what may not be one of them.29
Perhaps it is odd to focus on how dumb technology could change or
eliminate large sectors of the practice of law relating to the ancient institution
of marriage. But one could also turn to corporation law, where the possibility
looms of blockchains replacing shares, corporations themselves, 30 content
licensing, 31 or countless other facets of commerce where lawyers have
traditionally played an important role in preparing or verifying documents,
which can now be replaced by technology. But this technology is still dumb
technology.

this author). See, e.g., Colin P.A. Jones, Japan's Koseki System: Dull, Uncaring but Terribly
Efficient, JAPAN TIMES (June 22, 2016), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community
/2016/06/22/issues/japans-koseki-system-dull-uncaring-terribly-efficient/;
Colin P.A. Jones,
Japan'sDiscriminatoryKoseki Registry System Looks Ever More Outdated, JAPAN TIMES (July
10,
2016),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/07/10/issues/japans-discrimina
tory-koseki-registry-system-looks-ever-outdated/#.WiTVVTT81BM.
28. Moreover, the family register system is merely one example of what could be called
a "pre-computer technology" code system. As I have posited elsewhere, the Japanese postal
system's naiya shamei (contents confirmed) letter service makes it possible to send a letter with
external confirmation of both the delivery and the contents and to deliver a threatening letter
that implies the sender is seriously contemplating legal action without actually hiring a lawyer
to send such a missive on law firm letterhead. Colin P.A. Jones, 9/11: The Day Japan'sSupreme
Court Went (Slightly) Postal, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.japantimes.co
jp/community/2016/10/09/issues/91 1-day-japans-supreme-court-went-slightly-postal/.
29. How court orders to change title of property will be enforced against a blockchainbased system is another interesting question. The answer seems likely to involve a solution
requiring little or no lawyer time once implemented.
30. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 15, at 87-144.
31. Id.at226-40.
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III. AL, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

I believe it can be said that attorneys are able to make a living as
intermediaries because of trust. It is common for lawyers to be characterized
as shysters, and they do not poll well on the subject of trust. 32 However,

pollster questions probably do not distinguish between other people's lawyers
and your lawyer.
You, as a client, presumably trust your lawyer because the lawyer has (or
at least appears to have) a suitably comforting combination of education and
experience in whatever legal matters you are using them for. A good attorney
will be (and should be) well-attuned to the emotional elements of your matter,
not just the legal and factual issues. As noted above, dumb technologies, like
blockchain, may remove the decision of whether to trust a transaction or a
person (as opposed to an entire system) from the equation. However, outside
those spheres, the role of lawyers as a trusted profession is likely to still be
meaningful-for a while at least.
In this aspect of the legal practice, even Al seems to be at a significant
disadvantage to its human competitors. I may trust a reactive, evaluative
computer algorithm to play the best possible game of chess, or strafe a terrorist
bunker with surgical precision, but can it advocate persuasively to human
audiences (assuming such advocacy remains a necessary feature of society)?
For all the databases and analytical power an Al-enabled robo-lawyer could
muster, would we want it to make the decisions about whether to pursue a
case your case? Will technologists be able to create Al who care about
justice or what its failure means to society? Would our Al robo-lawyer ever
be able to evaluate the likelihood of success and merits of pursuing cases like
Gideon v. Wainwright33 or Miranda v. Arizona?34 Would they consider it
worthwhile to pursue a writ of coram nobis for Fred Korematsu to vacate the
unjust conviction he was burdened with through the Supreme Court case that
bears his name? 35
It seems difficult to assume that an Al can be made to care about anything
that has been important to humans, and caring has arguably long been a key

32.

See, e.g., Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), http://

news.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx (illustrating a Gallup poll of
Honesty/Ethics in Professions that was conducted December 7-11, 2016, showing 82% of
respondents ranking lawyers in the bottom three of five possible levels of trustworthiness, with
45% viewing them as only "average").

33.
34.
35.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Korematsuv. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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element of the practice of law. One likes to think. But caring is just one facet
of the lawyer-client relationship.
My assumption is that lawyers care about their matters for a variety of
reasons. Some may seek justice; others may take pride in their work or derive
emotional satisfaction from helping clients achieve goals; some (but surely
only a few) are just in it for the money. But whatever their personal
motivation, I assume that lawyers also care about their matters because they
have to. The rules of professional conduct and liability mean that lawyers can
be relied upon trusted because they can be disciplined, disbarred, or sued
for professional malpractice if they fail to perform to a certain standard. This
is in addition to the competitive and customer satisfaction imperatives
applicable to any business in the service industry that lawyers must also
grapple with. This is part of the trust.
Could the rules of professional responsibility ever be made to apply
meaningfully to a non-human, Al lawyer? I will leave the answer to
technologists, but I have my doubts. But those expecting this to transition into
a conclusion favoring human lawyers should be warned that it will not.
You see, one of my basic assumptions about responsibility is that it sucks.
For the most part, "to take responsibility" has negative connotations of
sanction or blame. Unless the rewards for taking responsibility are
commensurate with the risks that accompany it, avoiding responsibility is
perfectly rational human behavior. Formal decision-making in the American
legal system is dominated by juries and judges. The true genius of the jury
system is arguably that it provides a clear nexus of responsibility for the
results of a trial that disappears instantly upon rendering its verdict. To the
extent the judges making decisions-including decisions about whether
congressional legislation shall remain in force-are federal judges, a defining
characteristic of their status is they can almost never be held to account for
anything they do on the bench.3 6
Lawyers can blame a bad result on a judge, jury, or regulator, but they are
still compensated, in part, for being identifiably and incontrovertibly
responsible for things that happen, such as filings being made on time, cases
being cited accurately, documents being read and drafted properly, and so
forth. But what if such things are done automatically by robots? And who is
responsible if they get things wrong, as they surely will?

36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. This may seem to be stating a truism of the justice system,
but some countries do not use jury systems widely or at all and have judges who are essentially
bureaucrats within a career system. The decisions these judges make can affect how they are
evaluated and promoted within that system. See, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control

ofJapaneseJudges, 25 KOBE U. L. REv. 45, 46-48 (1991).
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An interesting debate that has sprung from the development of Al and
military technology is whether autonomous weapon-equipped drones should
be given discretion to make targeting and launch decisions without human
intervention. 37 Recurring themes involve both the morality of letting robots
decide to kill humans and how such killings should fit into the existing
framework of the laws of conflict. 38 The Pentagon has issued statements that

humans will always be involved in "kill" decisions, 39 yet a growing chorus of
experts has expressed alarm about the development of autonomous war
machines. 40

Yet based on my own admittedly cynical assumptions about how most
people view responsibility, I think much of this debate fails to address the
possibility that humans will come to find Al a convenient responsibility
nexus. Al can take responsibility for decisions humans would rather not make
and actions they would rather not take. Research shows that even most trained
soldiers have an aversion to killing other human beings, 4 1 and a great deal of
military technology developed well before drones-automatic weapons, longranged artillery, aerial bombardment is arguably effective not only because
of its destructive power but because it inserts delay and distance between

37. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Accountability and Decision Making in Autonomous
Warfare: Who is Responsible?, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 393, 397 (2017); Peter Finn, A Futurefor
Drones: Automated Killing, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/national-security/a-future-for-drones-automated-killing/2011/09/15/glQAVy9mgK st
ory.html?utmterm=.545c207ala59;
ROBIN GEISS, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG, THE
INTERNATIONAL-LAW DIMENSIONS OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 17-18 (2015), http
://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/1 1673.pdf; NILS MELZER, EUR. PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATEGEN. FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES, HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE USAGE OF DRONES AND
UNMANNED ROBOTS IN WARFARE 11 (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/et

udes/etudes/join/2013/410220/EXPO-DROI ET(2013)410220_EN.pdf; Daniel Suarez, The
Kill Decision Shouldn't Belong to a Robot, TED (2013), https://www.ted.com/talk
s/daniel suarez the kill decisionshouldn t belong to a robot/discussion.
38. See, e.g., James Foy, Autonomous Weapons Systems: Taking the Human Out of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw (Apr. 20, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2290995; Jeffrey S.
Thurnher, The Law That Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, ASIL (Jan. 18, 2013),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applies-autonomous-weapon-systems.
39. Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon:A Human Will Always Decide When a Robot Kills You,
WIRED (Nov. 26, 2012, 8:12 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/1 1/human-robot-kill/.
40. See, e.g., Paul Scharre, The Trouble with Trying to Ban 'Killer Robots', WORLD
ECON. F. (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/09/should-machines-nothumans-make-life-and-death-decisions-in-war/ (referencing an open letter by CEOs of 100
artificial intelligence and robotics companies to the U.N. warning of the dangers of autonomous
weapons).
41.

See DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO

KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY 89, 111, 180 (2009) (describing the psychological effects of killing
that humans endure during war).
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human actions and the death and horror it causes. While the morality of doing
so may be questionable, it seems inevitable that the seductive and
understandable ability to ease the psychological burdens of killing means the
advent of autonomous war machines will be a matter of when, not if.42
In fact, the debate may not be as new as we think; modem society has
already spent decades, if not centuries, grappling with the moral and legal
ramifications of creating artificial beings, regulating how they make
decisions, and allocating responsibility for the things they do. These beings
3
are called corporations.4

I recognize that there is a fundamental difference between corporations
on the one hand and robots/Al on the other. Obviously, the former are
creations of law and the latter of technology. But the subject at hand is
responsibility.
For years now I have been asking rooms full of law students some very
basic questions why do we use corporations? What is the advantage they
have over human beings? Based on my rough recollection, I would say that
the most common answer is that corporations limit liability, and the second
most common is that corporations enable a pooling of resources and similar
collective effort.
None has ever not without much prodding, at least given what I
consider to be the most historically accurate, if not fundamentally correct,
response: we use corporations because they do not die, at least not
unexpectedly. They thus play a very basic role in freeing business and
ownership from the terrible unpredictability of human mortality. 44
Facilitating collective investment and action is of course another basic
reason for using corporations. Yet it does not follow that limited liability is
naturally part of the package. One of the older corporate forms still with us is
the general partnership, the defining characteristic of which is the joint and

42. Colin P.A. Jones, Why Robots Will Be Granted a License to Kill, in Japan and
Everywhere Else, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/
2015/03/11 /issues/robots-will-granted-license-kill-japan-everywhere-else/#.Wi0aODT81BM.
43. Writing in 1898, Maitland exclaimed that, "Such in these days is our 'propensity to
feign' . . . that the law can find no place for the new persons, the new species and genera of
persons, whom we are daily calling into existence." FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP

AND BOROUGH 15-16 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1964) (1898).
44.

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 208 (Bernard

C. Gavit ed., Washington Law Book Co. 1941) ("As all personal rights die with the person, it
has been found necessary, when the public is benefitted by the continuance of particular rights,
to constitute artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of
legal immortality.").
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several liability of its partners. 45 Going back far enough in time, we find that
being a member of a corporation involved being potentially liable for the
satisfaction in full of its debts. 46 Limiting liability to the amount invested is
generally associated with joint stock corporations, the establishment of which
is typically historically associated with the highly risky business of exploiting
foreign colonies, and thus serves a quasi-foreign policy role. 47 Although, by
the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries in the mid-18th century, such
entities were already being used in the development of domestic ventures, yet
he did not seem to find joint stock companies worthy of even mentioning in
his Commentaries.
While limited liability is not, collective action arguably is, or at least was,
a fundamental characteristic of corporations. A mere century ago, F.W.
Maitland was able to write a deeply insightful essay on the puzzling nature of
the corporation sole, a corporation with but a single human member why
was it necessary to create a legal person separate from its sole member? 48
Indian company law did not provide for a single-shareholder corporation until
it was amended in 2013, and even then, the law is subject to a limit that the
same person can only be a member of one such entity. 49 Philippines' company
law still requires at least five shareholders in order to incorporate a
company.so

45. For a discussion of a suitable vintage, see, for example, George Wharton Pepper,
What Constitutes a Partnership,46 AM. L. REG. 137, 142 (1898).
46. See, e.g., 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 487, 520 (2nd ed. 1898) (stating,

on page 487, that, "If we insist that the common law can not [sic] hold the singuli liable for the
debt of the universitas, we shall find little to say about corporations in any century earlier than
the fifteenth," and stating, on page 520, that, "We have indeed observed before now that the
non-liability of individual corporators for the debts of the corporation can not [sic] be regarded
as of the essence ofa corporation.Still unless such non-liability had been common, the modern
idea of a corporation would hardly have been formed." (third emphasis added)).
47. Philip Lipton, The Evolution of the Joint Stock Company to 1800: A Study of
InstitutionalChange 13 (Monash Univ. Workplace & Corp. Law Research Grp., Working Paper
No. 15, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1413502 ("[I]ncorporation
and trade monopolies were granted by Royal charter to those who furthered government policy
by equipping the navy, establishing colonies or discovering new trading routes" that opened up
lucrative commercial opportunities and diminished reliance on other countries for access to
Asian commodities, especially spices.).
48.

F.W. MAITLAND, The CorporationSole, in STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 9-31

(David Runciman & Magnus Ryan eds., 2003) (1900).
49. The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013); FAQs on One Person
Company,

MINISTRY

OF

CORP.

AFFAIRS

Gov'T

OF

INDIA,

http://www.mca.gov.

in/MinistryV2/onepersoncompany.html (last updated Feb. 13, 2018).
50. CORPORATION CODE, § 10, B.P.Blg. 68 (Phil.).
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Yet in the Western world, at least, it seems to have become an article of
faith that the principal reason for incorporating is to limit liability.5 Not only
for debts and torts committed by the business but for taxes as well. 52 We find
it not the slightest bit odd that each of us can individually create multiple
corporations in which we own 100% of the shares, use them to earn money,
and have them pay us salaries and buy things we need and use, all the while
protecting our personal assets from the taxes and other consequences of the
company's activities. Even though, in reality, these activities are our own.
And, if through mistake or malice, our companies cause harm to others or, to
put it more accurately, if we cause harm to others through our companies, we
personally are generally safe from its consequences unless we have done
something to allow the corporate veil to be pierced.
The intent is not to decry corporate shields or debate the merits of limited
liability or tax policies that encourage the use of corporate vehicles. As
already noted, my basic assumption is that avoiding responsibility a
synonym for "liability," after all-is perfectly rational human behavior. That
people use the tools available for doing so is only natural, as is the fact that
many lawyers now practice through limited liability partnerships or
companies. 53
The point is that we tend to lose sight of the fact that our economic growth
is based in part on encouraging potentially irresponsible behavior through the
proliferation of limited liability entities. This often tends to be done in the
name of "innovation" or "entrepreneurship," but, to paraphrase the perennial
caution about fun given by parents to children playing with pointy sticks or
pellet guns, it's only innovation until someone loses an eye. 54
This may be a Good Thing for our economic welfare, but it also seems to
mean that extremely terrible things-death from defective products, even

51. See, e.g., E.J. Dealy, Five Reasons Why a Small Business Should Incorporate, FOX
Bus. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/five-reasons-why-a-small-busi
ness-should-incorporate ("No. 1. Personal asset protection .... In a properly structured and
managed corporation or LLC, owners should have limited liability for business debts and
obligations."); CT Corporation Staff, When ShouldlIncorporate?,WOLTERS KLUWER (Nov. 9,
2017), https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/when-should-i-incorporate ("Limited
liability protection Operating as a sole proprietorship invites risk .... If your business incurs
debts (if you can't pay your suppliers or commercial lease, for example) or an accident occurs,
then you are personally liable for them. If a corporation or LLC owns the business, that
corporation or LLC is liable for its debts, not its shareholders or members.").
52. Dealy, supra note 51 ("Both corporations and LLCs may deduct normal business
expenses, including salaries, before they allocate income to owners.").
53. See Allison Martin-Rhodes et al., Law Firms'EntityChoices Reflect Appeal ofNewer
Business Forms, LAW FIRM ORG., July/Aug. 2014, at 16, 18.
54. And the person who does is usually not the innovator.
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systemic financial collapse-can happen without anyone being held
responsible for them. Corporations cannot be imprisoned, finding their
managers criminally liable is difficult, and the pursuit of civil liability is likely
just an insurance claim for those pursued. 5 Again, depending on your
perspective, this is a feature, not a bug.
So, what could this mean for Al that could purport to practice law beyond
ministerial tasks and "dumb technology" information processing or even just
to assist human lawyers to make better decisions? There are, I think, two sides
to the question: the client side and the attorney side.
In the American system, clients are, of course, free not to seek counsel.
Consulting an attorney usually involves costs and makes life complicated a
client who consults a lawyer either needs to follow their advice or be able to
justify not doing so. For the manager or director of a corporate client, not
getting legal advice, or not following it when given, can have grave
implications-responsibility!-if things go wrong.
Let us suppose that a sophisticated corporate client needs advice on how
arcane U.S. security regulations are likely to apply to a highly atypical set of
facts or proposed transaction. The applicability of the regulations and
rendering of any sort of advice requires reviewing countless SEC no-action
letters and publicly available telephone interpretations.
We shall also suppose that the client has two options. First, the client can
consult a top Wall Street firm, one with partners who have worked at the SEC
in the staff, and brilliant junior associates who can work punishing hours
researching the appropriate databases. Second, the client can consult an Al
that can quickly research all relevant databases in order to identify and analyze
relevant comparatives.
In both options, the client will be given an evaluation and a
recommendation. The Al will be sophisticated enough to give its advice with
suitably lawyerly hedging-if it deems it appropriate. When initially
presented with these two options, it seems likely the client would seek
recommendations from both and compare. 56

55. See SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA'S CORPORATE AGE, at XV (2016) ("Working people suffer the injustices while

corporations and their executives get away with everything up to and including homicide.").
56. Of course, if it is an either-or choice, other factors may be determinative. Which costs
more? Is the Al a sunken capital expenditure or made available on an operating expense basis,
like most attorney fees? If the latter, how does it compare to the cost of human legal advice? Let
us acknowledge that, in the real world, these too will likely be important considerations before
consciously ignoring them for purposes of this discussion.
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How should the client deal with discrepancies in advice given by the Al
and the client's human lawyers (if any)? Some insights may be derived from
a chapter by Jason Millar and Ian Kerr in a recent book on the law of
robotics. 5 Approaching the problem of robot and human expert
disagreement, principally in the context of medical diagnoses and whether
human experts should have an "override" over evaluations by robot-experts,
they suggest there might be four possible scenarios: (i) the Al and human
agree, and there is a positive ("desirable") outcome; (ii) the Al and human
agree, and there is a negative ("undesirable") outcome; (iii) the Al and the
human disagree, but the Al gets it right (i.e., the outcome is positive if the
Al's advice is followed but not if the human's is); and (iv) the Al and the
human disagree, but the Al gets it wrong (i.e., the reverse of situation (iii)). 5

1

Millar and Kerr dismiss scenarios (i) and (ii) as being of "little interest,"
since scenarios where both options generate positive outcomes are unlikely to
be controversial, and where both produce bad results, both human and robot
are equally blameworthy. 59 As I will show shortly, I believe things are
actually more complicated, particularly in scenario (ii).
Discussing the ramifications of scenarios where robots "get it right,"
Millar and Kerr point out that this evaluation would have been validated by
empirical evidence and thus difficult for human experts to argue against. 60
This would render it of questionable merit to accord human experts an
"override" over any particular decisions the robot-expert seeks to make, the
exercise of which would be "contra-evidence based." 61 Millar and Kerr
conclude that:
Owing to the evidence in their favor .

. ,

it is more appropriate to

think of expert robots as above average in their ability to make
decisions that will produce desirable outcomes. This fact suggests
that granting a general decision-making authority to human experts
will be problematic once expert robots are properly on the scene. 62
Interestingly, their conclusions about giving humans decision-making
authority over expert robots do not change even when the robot gets it wrong.

57. Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, Delegation, Relinquishment, and Responsibility: The
Prospect ofExpert Robots, in ROBOT LAW 102-27 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
58. Id. at 119-24.
59. Id. at 120.
60. Id. at 120-21.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 122.
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This is because, in any particular case, a human expert demonstrably getting
it right could be an example of the human expertise being superior to that of
the robot, but "if one accepts the normative pull of evidence-based practice,
then they are always cases of moral luck." 63
Evidence-based practice suggests that we ought to act according to
the best available evidence, and, in cases of robot-human expert
disagreement, that means we ought (ethically) to delegate decisionmaking authority to the robots when we know that they outperform
human experts. Cases in which human experts over-ride expert robot
decisions are, ceteris paribus, ethically problematic. That on
occasion a human expert might override an expert robot's decision
and produce desirable outcomes does not provide any systematic
criterion for generating the best outcomes. Evidence-based practice,
on the other hand, is meant to accomplish just that. It is only by post
hoc analysis of cases of disagreement (or any case involving corobotics involving expert robots) that we can assess the competing
possibilities relative to one another. Prior to the outcome, that is, at
the time when we are forced to make decisions, both choices look
identical-there is no systematic overriding consideration upon
which to base a decision other than the expert robot's evidence-based
track record.64
They close their consideration of these four scenarios with the conclusion
that "it is not difficult to imagine a smooth and simple logic that would lead a
society like ours to delegate increasingly significant decision-making to future
Watson-like robots." 65

So informed, let us return to the dispensing of legal advice by human and
robot-experts. Assuming that evidence-based "good" and "bad" results are
capable of actually (or seemingly!) objective verification in the same way as
medical diagnoses, I think it can be supposed that it would follow the same
progression. However, I also think it is fanciful to suppose that human lawyers
and Al-lawyers would coexist in the same advisory sphere for long past a
certain stage in the latter's development. Once an Al is validated as providing
at least as reliable advice as human lawyers, why would clients keep using
humans with all else being equal?

63. Id. at 123 (citing THOMAS NAGEL,
WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981)).

MORTAL QUESTIONS

64. Id.
65. Id. at 124. "Watson" is IBM's Al
https://www.ibm.com/watson/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
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They will not be equal, perhaps; in our arcane securities regulation
question, a client might attach particular significance to the human's
experience in the SEC and who the human knows there. It seems unlikely that
Al will be able to replace humans in having human connections, but then we
are not really talking about legal advice. In any case, Al will probably at least
become very good at predicting how repeat actors judges and other decision
makers-respond to particular motions, arguments, or fact patterns.66 So,
again, why would clients rely on human lawyers for anything other than an
aspect of the problem that does not require legal advice?
One possible answer is that human lawyers might be desirable for
recourse. But then we need to look at the other side of the equation and ask
why human lawyers would stick around to either assume liability for an Al's
bad decision by endorsing it, or risk liability by preventing an Al's decision
from being implemented by second guessing it if the human turns out to be
wrong? Once the robots get to a certain level of verifiable reliability, it would
seem there is nothing but downside for human professionals to remain in that
space.
I also think Millar and Kerr are wrong in dismissing scenario (i) (robot
and human are both right) and scenario (ii) (robot and expert are both wrong)
in the same breath as "relatively unproblematic." They are actually quite
different in a very crucial way. In (i) there is no liability issue, while in (ii)
there is. More importantly still, in (ii) a human expert's errors can result in
them suffering reputational or financial harm, even imprisonment, if their
negligence is criminal. A robot's reputation might suffer (until the next
upgrade), but otherwise, it is indifferent to being wrong; it is immune to the
most basic deterrent, punitive and restorative aspects of the law as are
corporations.
In fact, Millar and Kerr seem to fudge the question of liability
responsibility for bad outcomes-or at least treat it as a problem to be solved
rather than a possible feature to be enhanced and exploited. They do posit that
"when time-sensitive decisions must be made and human and robot-experts
disagree, and where an undesirable outcome is the result of the decision
because either the expert robot or human expert was in error, it will be difficult
to assess liability in the established way." 67 They suggest "first principles or
useful common law analogies" might be a solution for robot-expert failures,
that the issue could be resolved in the "usual manner," and that "human

66.
processes
"who you
67.

This modeling, of course, ignores the possibility that Al-based decision-making
will also be playing a greater role within institutions like the SEC and thus making
know" less important.
Millar & Kerr, supra note 57, at 123.
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experts would be called in to give testimony .... Eventually, a judge would
weigh the evidence of the competing experts and decide whether the standard
of care was breached or not." 68
But they immediately acknowledge the difficulty of determining the
appropriate standard of care for a robot, the resulting paradox of possibly
having "no evidentiary rationale for explaining the [bad] outcome generated
by the expert robot," and the difficulty or impossibility of formulating "an
explanation on behalf of the medical center's reliance on the expert robot." 69
This is an important point; what standard of care should apply once the
medical center (or legal advice provider) can say with supporting statistical
evidence, "We ran the scenario through our AL, which has proved to be correct
X% of the time?" X will likely be a crucial number, but how low does it have
to be for the defendant to have done more? 70
Perhaps claims can still be brought against the humans who made,
programmed, or relied on the robot or the Al controlling it. But the robot being
firmly located between the resulting harm and any putative human tortfeasors
in the causal chain would make the pursuit more tenuous than it already is. As
would, no doubt, the inevitable intermediation of numerous corporate
'

entities. 7

This may actually suit clients and lawyers perfectly well. Clients will be
able to satisfy whatever internal or external responsibility they have to seek
legal advice by consulting with a demonstrably competent Al. Lawyers-if
they still exist in the relevant sphere-can turn the matter over to an Al and
say it was the best they could do, a statement which may well be true at some
point and which should shield them from liability claims. In any case,
plaintiffs' lawyers will presumably have the same problem proving the
applicable standard of care, as discussed above, along with the problem that
it was breached by someone capable of being held liable.
Once human lawyers have been driven from the field, perhaps the dumb
technologies described earlier in this Article and Al will not be so different in
their impact. Arguably, humans will be free to ignore their Al's legal advice,

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Human juries may well disfavor such arguments, so perhaps we should hope that they
are not replaced by robots.
71. Given the discussion so far, commentary to the effect that movements towards giving
robots legal personality will help make corporations accountable seem positively naive given
the important role that corporations play in shielding humans. See, e.g., James Vincent, Giving
Robots Personhood' is Actually About Making CorporationsAccountable, VERGE (Jan. 19,
2017, 10:45 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/19/14322334/robot-electronic-personseu-report-liability-civil-suits (writing about EU deliberations to redefine the legal status of
robots).
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even though unable to bypass the prohibitions of dumb code. But will the
difference always be clear? The Al will no longer actually be a "lawyer" who
provides advice in the traditional sense anyways. And in the countless ways
that humans are evaluated, how will disregarding well-founded Al
recommendations factor into such evaluations, particularly when those
evaluations themselves increasingly involve technological enhancements? At
what point will Al-enabled corporate "internal controls and procedures"
continue to even permit corporate actions to be taken in violation of Alenabled legal advice? Dumb technology may make it increasingly difficult to
take such advice anyways, and even if humans can override it, the shareholder
lawsuits for doing so seem obvious (as they do with existing controls and
procedures regimes).
The preceding paragraph is particularly speculative, and the future is a
vast field of question marks. That said, it is worth remembering that
historically, technology appears to have driven human behavior as much as
the reverse-and not always for the better. In their very useful essay on killer
robots, Ian Kerr and Katie Szilagyi remind us of a simple example: how the
development of mechanical tomato harvesting technology in the 1940s led to
the development of sturdier (but less tasty) strains of tomato that could better
survive the rigors of the "modern" harvesting process. 72 The result was better
harvests but not better tomatoes, not to mention the loss of tens of thousands
of human jobs. 73
The logic of technologies, both those that are intelligent and those that are
stupid yet meticulous and unforgiving, will inevitably impact the practice of
law. The need to balance one's freedom of action and the possibility of being
held responsible for the consequences of acting are basic features of human
existence. Arguably, they never will be for Al or robots, at least not in a way
that humans can understand. As stated earlier, it seems unlikely that Al will
ever be able to engage in truly effective advocacy, which is one of the most
basic and meaningful roles of any lawyer worth the title. The question is
whether technology will allow any spheres where advocacy still matters,
spheres where there are still human decision makers to both listen and be
responsible-even if only morally for making choices based on that
advocacy.

72. See Ian Kerr & Katie Szilagyi, Asleep at the Switch? How Killer Robots Become a
Force Multiplier of Military Necessity, in ROBOT LAW 333, 352-56 (Ryan Calo et al. eds.,
2016).
73. Id at 352.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

21

*

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 6

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss3/6

22

